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ABSTRACT
We study the determinants of the extent of outsourcing and of direct foreign investment in
an industry in which producers need specialized components. Potential suppliers must make a
relationship-specific investment in order to serve each prospective customer. Such investments are
governed by imperfect contracts. A final-good producer can manufacture components for itself, but
the per-unit cost is higher than for specialized suppliers.  We consider how the size of the cost
differential, the extent of contractual incompleteness, the size of the industry, and the relative wage













International outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been growing in
leaps and bounds. As Audet (1996), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998),
Hummels et al. (2001) and Yeats (2001) have documented, ﬁrms in many countries
are sub-contracting abroad an expanding range of activities, from product design
and the production of intermediate inputs to assembly, marketing, and after-sales
service. Meanwhile, the same and other ﬁrms have been engaging in ever more
foreign investment. Although a debate continues about whether the preponderance
of FDI is horizontal or vertical in nature, there can be no doubt that the production of
intermediate inputs is an important activity in foreign subsidiaries, and increasingly
so. Hanson et al. (2001) provide evidence on the global expansion of U.S.-based
ﬁrms.
A burgeoning literature is seeking to identify the sources of these trends. For ex-
ample, Jones (2000) has modiﬁed the traditional models of international trade to deal
more fully with trade in intermediate inputs, while Grossman and Helpman (2002a)
have developed a model of monopolistic competition in which global outsourcing of
components competes with domestic outsourcing. More generally, researchers have
been trying to understand better how production is organized; see Aghion and Tirole
(1995), Marin and Verdier (2001), Grossman and Helpman (2002b), and Puga and
Treﬂer (2002) for just a few of the many recent examples.
In this paper, we combine elements from Grossman and Helpman (2002a) and
(2002b) in order to shed light on the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e nF D Ia n di n t e r n a t i o n a lo u t -
sourcing. We develop a model of an industry that produces diﬀerentiated consumer
goods. Each producer needs a specialized component to serve as an input into the
production of its ﬁnal goods. We assume that it is cheapest to produce these com-
ponents in the South, where wages are low.1 Specialized suppliers are more eﬃcient
1Thus, to keep things simple, we limit the choice of organizational mode to two alternatives.
Similarly, in Grossman and Helpman (2002a) we studied the determinants of the location of out-
sourcing in a setting where outsourcing was assumed superior to integrated production, while in
Grossman and Helpman (2002b) we examined the relative advantages of integrated production and
1producers of the inputs, but the bilateral relationships between suppliers and ﬁnal
producers are plagued by contractual incompleteness. Final producers are distin-
guished by the characteristics of the components they need, while suppliers diﬀer in
their expertise. In equilibrium, some producers choose to negotiate subcontracting
arrangements while others opt to serve as their own suppliers. Our analysis focuses
on the relative prevalence of these alternative modes of organization.
After developing the model in the next section, we characterize an industry equi-
librium in section 3. The industry equilibrium takes account of the eﬀects of the
numbers of ﬁnal and intermediate good producers on the proﬁtability of entry and
exit. But we assume that the industry faces an inﬁnitely elastic supply of labor,
thereby abstracting from the general-equilibrium feedbacks to relative wages. In sec-
tion 4, we use the model to examine the prevalence of each mode of organization. In
particular, we investigate the eﬀects of: (a) productivity diﬀerences between special-
ized and integrated producers of inputs; (b) industry size; (c) the degree of contractual
incompleteness; and (d) relative wages in the two regions, on market share of ﬁrms
that outsource the production of components relative to those that produce their own
components in foreign subsidiaries.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider the organization of ﬁrms in industry equilibrium. The industry that
we study produces an endogenous number of diﬀerentiated consumer goods. These
goods are designed in the North at a cost of wfn per variety, where w is the wage
rate in the North and fn is the amount of Northern labor needed to design a product.
We assume that the industry is small in relation to the size of the Northern labor
m a r k e t ,s ot h a ti tc a nh i r ea sm u c hl a b o ra si tw i s h e sa tt h eﬁxed wage w.
The production of a unit of any variety requires one unit of a specialized com-
ponent. In the analysis here, we assume that it is cost-eﬀective to produce these
components in the South, where the wage is substantially lower than in the North.
outsourcing in a closed economy.
2We thus neglect the determination of the location of component production (which
was the subject of Grossman and Helpman, 2002) in order to focus on the relative
prevalence of outsourcing versus direct foreign investment. We normalize the South-
ern wage to equal one, and assume that it too is not aﬀected by demand from the
industry under consideration.
Consumers spend a constant fraction β of their income on output from the indus-
try.2 They view the varieties produced by the industry as symmetrically diﬀerentiated
and perceive a constant elasticity of substitution between every pair of goods. World
income is I = wLN + LS,w h e r eLi is the ﬁxed labor supply in country i.T h u s ,t h e








is a measure of industry demand, p(j) is the price of variety j,a n dε > 1 is the
elasticity of demand. The integral in the denominator of (2) is taken over all available
brands. As is well known, with CES preferences, the elasticity of demand is equal to
the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
On the supply side, a consumer good is distinguished by the characteristics of the
component that is used in its production. We represent the characteristics of the
component needed to produce a good by a point on the circumference of the unit
circle. Final producers do not choose their locations on the circle; rather, this is
a matter of technology. When a ﬁrm designs a consumer good, it receives a draw
from a uniform distribution of locations. Thus, with a continuum of entrants, the
ﬁnal producers are spread evenly around the circle. We take n to be the measure of
entrants, which represents as well the density of ﬁnal goods at each location on the
circle.
An integrated producer can manufacture the component it needs with λ > 1 units
of labor per unit of output. An integrated producer need not pay any ﬁxed cost to
2It would be straightforward to extend the model to allow for a constant elasticity of demand for
industry output diﬀerent from one.
3design or manufacture its own components beyond what it has already incurred to
enter the industry.3 Inasmuch as w>1, an integrated producer will always choose to
manufacture components in a subsidiary located in the low-wage South. Thus, the
marginal cost of production for an integrated producer is λ.
A producer might alternatively purchase its components from a specialized sup-
plier. The number of suppliers m is ﬁnite and endogenous. Each supplier chooses its
expertise, which we also represent by a point on the circumference of the unit circle.
To develop such expertise, a potential supplier must deploy fm units of labor. Since
we shall focus on an equilibrium in which all outsourcing takes place in the South,
t h ec o s to fe n t r yf o rs u p p l i e r si sfm, the product of the input requirement for entry
and the Southern wage rate. A supplier must also incur an additional ﬁxed cost in
order to develop a prototype for a particular end user. The size of the requisite in-
vestment is proportional to the distance along the circumference of the circle between
the location of the ﬁnal-good producer and the expertise of the supplier. If a sup-
plier has an expertise in producing components that are very close (in characteristics
space) to what the producer needs, then the cost of customization will be modest.
If, however, the supplier has expertise in components that are quite diﬀerent from
what the producer needs, then the required investment will be larger. We assume
that customization requires µx units of labor when the supplier and ﬁnal producer
are separated by a distance x. In the equilibria that we study, this investment is
undertaken in the South, so µx is also the cost of customization. If a supplier invests
in the prototype for a particular ﬁnal producer, it can thereafter manufacture such
components with one unit of (Southern) labor per unit of output.
A ﬁnal producer can approach any supplier in an attempt to arrange for the
outsourcing of components.4 However, the producer only has enough time to negotiate
3We could introduce an extra ﬁxed cost for ﬁrms that produce their own components in foreign
subsidiaries without any qualitative eﬀect on our conclusions.
4In Grossman and Helpman (2002), we modelled a process of costly search by ﬁnal producers for
suitable outsourcing partners. Final producers were assumed not to know the exact locations of the
m suppliers along the circle, although they were assumed to know the number of such suppliers (the
“thickness” of the market) and that such suppliers are equally spaced in equilibrium. We assumed
4with a single potential supplier. Moreover, should the negotiation between a ﬁnal
producer and a potential supplier fail, the producer no longer will have suﬃcient
time to prepare for self supply. Thus, each ﬁrm makes an initial decision whether to
conduct negotiations or to open a subsidiary. Should it decide to seek outside supply,
it chooses a potential supplier. If the negotiations with that supplier ultimately fail,
the ﬁnal producer has no choiceb u tt oe x i tt h em a r k e t .
The outsourcing relationships that are formed are governed by incomplete con-
tracts. That is, we assume that a third party cannot verify all of the tasks required
to customize a component. The ﬁnal producer and supplier can write a contract that
covers the performance of at most a fraction γ < 1/2 of the requisite investment in
the prototype. We take γ t oaap a r a m e t e rr e ﬂecting the state of the legal system
in the host country, as well as the technological characteristics of the customization
technology.
We assume that negotiations between a producer of consumer goods and a po-
tential supplier take place in two stages. First, the parties negotiate an investment
contract that governs the investment in a prototype. Such a contract stipulates the
tasks that the supplier must successfully complete in order to qualify for a ﬁrst-stage
payment, and the size of the payment P that must be made by the producer in the
event that the supplier fulﬁlls its end of the deal. Of course, the contractible tasks
can include only those that can be veriﬁed by an outside party; i.e., at most a fraction
γ of the total requisite investment cost. In the event that the supplier develops a
workable prototype (i.e., makes the full investment necessary to render its expertise
useful in producing the necessary components), the two parties meet again to nego-
tiate an order contract. The order contract governs the production and exchange of
components. It stipulates a volume of output and a price.5 At each stage, the par-
that by conducting a search of intensity x,r e q u i r i n gηx2 units of labor, a producer could identify
all suppliers within an arc length of 2x along the circle. The simplier model described here can be
seen as the limiting case of a model with costly search, as the cost parameter η goes to zero.
5The parties do not negotiate the quantity and price at the outset, because the supplier might
then produce a volume of components to deliver without making the necessary investment in cus-
tomization. In other words, we assume that third parties can verify the quantity of components but
5ties share equally in any surplus they would derive from continuing their relationship
relative to their outside options.
3 The Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize an equilibrium in which some ﬁnal producers out-
source the production of components and others manufacture their own components
in foreign subsidiaries. We begin by discussing the outsourcing relationships that
are formed. We then describe the behavior of integrated ﬁrms. Next, we discuss the
entry of suppliers and ﬁnal producers. Finally, we develop a diagram that we use to
solve for equilibrium values of the endogenous variables.
3.1 Outsourcing Partnerships
Consider a ﬁnal producer that chooses to seek an outsourcing partner. In equilibrium,
we will ﬁnd that such a producer either is indiﬀerent between alternative suppliers,
or it prefers to negotiate with the one whose expertise is in producing components
that are closer to its own input requirements. We thus assume provisionally that each
producer desiring an outsourcing partner negotiates with the input supplier whose
expertise is closest in input characteristics space to the location of its own component
needs.
Let the supplier that is closest to a particular ﬁn a lp r o d u c e rb ea tad i s t a n c ex.
Once a prototype exists (if ever it does exist), this supplier will be able to produce
components at a marginal cost of one. Since this cost is independent of the distance
x, so too will be the maximal proﬁt st h a tt h et w op a r t i e sc a ns h a r eb ys u b s e q u e n t l y
agreeing to an order contract. Denote these joint proﬁts by So.T h eﬁnal producer
and potential supplier anticipate that they will share equally in any surplus that de-
rives from an order contract between them, in the event that a workable prototype
exists. Moreover, the input supplier will have no alternative use for the prototype
should the talks break down at the time that the order contract is being discussed,
not whether the characteristics of the components match producer’s needs.
6nor will the ﬁnal producer have any alternative source of supply for its inputs. Ac-
cordingly, both ﬁrms will face outside options of zero in the second stage. It follows
that each side expects to earn So/2 in the event that an investment contract is signed
and if the supplier subsequently opts to make the full investment µx necessary for
the development of a workable prototype.
The supplier will make the full investment in customization if and only if what it
stands to earn from an order contract matches or exceeds the cost of the discretionary
(non-contracted) investment tasks. Thus, the two sides can expect the development
of a workable prototype if and only if µx(1−γ) ≤ So/2 or x ≤ So/2µ(1−γ).I no t h e r
words, if the expertise of the supplier is close enough to the needs of the producer,
then there is the possibility of a gainful outsourcing relationship; otherwise, not.
What about the up-front payment that would be agreed in an investment contract?
In Grossman and Helpman (2002) we show that this payment as a function of the











that is, no payment is made when the expertise of the supplier is very close to the
needs of the producer, whereas the two sides share the total investment cost equally
when the the distant between the two is in an intermediate range. This outcome
reﬂects the fact that the supplier stands ready to make the full investment in cus-
tomization even without any formal investment contract payment when µx ≤ So/2.
Should the input supplier make the full investment in customization, the parties
will meet again to discuss an order contract. At that stage, their interests will
coincide regarding the production and marketing of the ﬁnal good. Therefore, they
will write an eﬃcient (joint proﬁt maximizing) contract to govern the manufacture
of components. The proﬁt maximizing price of consumer good with a marginal cost
of one is po =1 /α,w h e r eα =1− 1/ε.T h em a x i m a lj o i n tp r o ﬁts are given by
S






73.2 FDI and the Choice of Organizational Form
If a ﬁnal producer chooses to manufacture its own components in a foreign subsidiary,
the marginal cost of those components will be λ > 1. Such a vertically integrated





Each ﬁnal producer faces a choice between manufacturing its own components
and approaching an external supplier. Firms that are located at a distance x>
So/2µ(1 − γ) from the nearest supplier certainly will choose to produce their own
components, because no existing suppliers would be willing to make the relationship-
speciﬁc investment necessary to serve their needs. As for the ﬁr m st h a th a v ea
potential supplier with expertise closer to what they need, they face a choice between
the proﬁts Sv that they can reap by manufacturing their own components and the
proﬁts So/2 − P(x) that they can expect in a negotiated agreement with a supplier.











which means that every ﬁnal-good producer that has a potential supplier willing to
invest in customization prefers outsourcing to integrated production.6 Then all ﬁrms







Notice that the cut-oﬀ point depends on the industry equilibrium, because So does.
6The assumption ensures that Sv <S o/2 − P(x) for x ≤ So/2µ(1 − γ). If, in contrast to our
assumption, λ
1−ε > 1/2,t h e na l lﬁnal producers prefer direct foreign investment to outsourcing.
Alternatively, if [1 − 1
2(1−γ)]/2 < λ
1−ε < 1/2,t h e ns o m eﬁrms that could ﬁnd outsourcing partners
willing to undertake the necessary investment will opt nonetheless to produce their own components.
We leave the analysis of this intermediate case to the interested reader.
83.3 Entry by Suppliers and Final Producers
Suppliers enter until proﬁt opportunities vanish. Each entrant maximizes its sales
and proﬁts, in view of the uniform distribution of ﬁnal producers along the unit circle,
by locating halfway between the two most distant competing suppliers. This means
that, in equilibrium, the suppliers locate symmetrically at a distance 1/m from one
another, where m is the number of such suppliers.7 Each supplier serves all ﬁnal
producers located within a distance xo from itself, which constitutes a measure 2nxo
of customers. Its marginal proﬁts from a customer at distance x is P(x)+So/2−µx,
the sum of the payment from the investment contract and the supplier’s share of
proﬁts from the order contract net of its investment cost. Total operating proﬁts for























which, in equilibrium, are equal to the ﬁxed cost of developing the expertise, fm.
A ﬁnal producer that pays wfn to design a product receives a random draw of
location in the component characteristics space. If its distance from the nearest
supplier in the market happens to be less than xo – which happens with probability
2mxo –t h e nt h eﬁrm will engage in outsourcing and realize proﬁts of So/2 − P(x),
where x is the distance to the nearest supplier. Otherwise, it will produce its own
components in a foreign subsidiary and realize proﬁts of Sv. The expected operating
proﬁts of a potential entrant are



























7For simplicity, we neglect the integer constraint on the (ﬁnite) number of suppliers, and treat
m as if it were a continuous variable.










Figure 1: Equilibrium values
where ρ =2 mxo is the fraction of ﬁnal producers that engage in outsourcing.
3.4 Solving for the Equilibrium
We can now illustrate the equilibrium in a simple diagram. In Figure 1, the nn curve
depicts equation (8), showing the combinations of xo and ρ for which ﬁnal producers
earn zero expected proﬁts. A second relationship between these variables is derived as
follows. From (2) and the expressions for the prices po and pv,w eﬁnd an expression
for A in terms of the endogenous variables n and ρ. We substitute this expression
into (4), and use (6) and πm = fm to derive
xo =
2fm (1 − γ)
(1 − α)β (wLN + LS)
¡







We depict this relationship, which is essentially a zero-proﬁt condition for component
suppliers, by the line mm in the ﬁgure. The equilibrium values of xo and ρ can be
found at point E.S i n c et h emm line slopes upward and the nn curve slopes downward,
the intersection (if it exists) is unique. We can ﬁnd the equilibrium number of
suppliers using m = ρ/2xo. Other variables of interest are readily computed.
104 Determinants of Organizational Form
We are now ready to examine the determinants of organizational form. We could
measure the prevalence of outsourcing either as the fraction of ﬁnal producers that
choose to outsource their components ρ or as the market share of ﬁnal producers
that engage in outsourcing. To calculate market shares, we weight the revenues of
ﬁrms that select a given organizational ﬁrm by the fraction of ﬁr m si ne a c hc a t e g o r y .
Using the equilibrium prices and the demand function in (1), we ﬁnd that the market




ρ +( 1− ρ)λ
1−ε .( 1 0 )
Consider ﬁrst a rather obvious determinant of the extent of outsourcing, which is
the productivity advantage of ﬁrms that specialize in producing components. This
a d v a n t a g ei sr e ﬂected in the size of the parameter λ.A ni n c r e a s ei nλ causes the mm
line to shift down and the nn curve to shift up. The result is an increase in ρ,t h e
fraction of ﬁrms that engage in outsourcing and an increase in σo,t h em a r k e ts h a r e
of such ﬁrms.
Next consider the eﬀect of industry size, which we measure by the fraction β of
aggregate spending that is devoted to the industry. An increase in β shifts the mm
line down. At the new equilibrium, the fraction ρ of ﬁrms that outsource is higher,
as is the market share of these ﬁrms. An increase in industry size favors outsourcing,
because it increases the spending on ﬁnal products relative to prices and costs. One
eﬀect of this is to increase the number of ﬁnal producers and thus the derived demand
for the services of any specialized producer of components. With greater demand
and given costs, there is entry by outsourcing ﬁrms. This creates a “thicker” market,
and allows more ﬁnal producers to ﬁnd suppliers with expertise relatively close to
their needs.
The contracting environment is another determinant of the equilibrium prevalence
of outsourcing. Recall that γ denotes the fraction of investment tasks that can be
veriﬁed by third parties. The greater is γ, the more complete are the contracts that
can be written to govern the relationship-speciﬁc investments. As γ increases, both
11the the mm line and the nn curve shift upward, but the latter shifts by proportionately
more.9 As a result, the fraction of ﬁrms that engage in outsourcing increases. So
d o e st h em a r k e ts h a r eo fs u c hﬁrms. When the contracting environment improves,
there are fewer investment tasks that are left to the discretion of a potential supplier.
Thus, it is more likely to be the case that the supplier’s share of the prospective
surplus will cover the cost of these non-contractible tasks. Given the number of
suppliers in the market, a ﬁn a lp r o d u c e ri sm o r el i k e l yt ob ea b l et oﬁnd one that
is willing to undertake the investment in customization. Thus, a greater fraction of
such producers are able to turn to such suppliers to ﬁll their demand for components.
Finally, consider the relative wage in the country that exports components. An
increase in the relative wage of the South is captured by a fall in w. This shifts the nn
curve downward and the mm curve upward, causing a decline in ρ and a decline in σo.
Af a l li nw spells a decline in world income relative to the cost of entry by intermediate
producers. It also spells an increase in the cost of product design, which tends to
reduce the measure of ﬁnal producers. Both of these eﬀects exert downward pressure
on the proﬁtability of component produces, causing the number of such producers to
fall. Finally, with a smaller number of suppliers, there are greater gaps between the
expertise of neighboring ﬁrms, and a smaller fraction of ﬁnal producers are able to
ﬁnd suppliers that will invest in a bilateral relationship.
9This can be seen by noting that both
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are increasing functions of γ for 0 < γ < 1/2.
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